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INTRODUCTION  
Arguably, militarization in African states is primarily a post-colonial phenomenon and it 
crystallized as a consequence of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, and the inordinate schemes developed by these powers to win 
friends and allies for their geopolitical strategies. Because militarization gained 
ascendancy among states with either disputed common borders or unsettled domestic 
politics, the phenomenon also could be said to have had demonstrable historic 
relationships with the European colonists' irresponsible demarcation of boundaries and 
management of political transitions to self-rule. Even Ethiopia which was never 
colonized is as much a product of the nineteenth-century European partition of Africa 
because of the historic intrigues and compromises on boundaries that divided and 
subjugated other ethnic groups. The growth and sustenance of military build-up could 
also be attributed to the insatiable desire of African ruling elites to maintain themselves in 
power through the threat or actual use of force. Regarding domestic politics, therefore, 
militarization is closely related to such factors as the problem of political legitimacy and 
the nature of relations between the state and civil society.  
Nowhere in Africa were the manifestations of militarization more evident than in the 
subregion of the Horn, which is geographically delimited by the territories of Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and tiny Djibouti. These countries have expended much of their resources and 
engaged foreign powers in their efforts to militarize. In March 1953, the Ethiopian 
monarch, Haile Selassie, contracted a mutual defense agreement with the United States 
under which the latter assumed responsibility for developing and expanding the imperial 
armed forces. Gaining independence in 1962, the Somali ruling elite, supported by the 
Soviet Union, also embarked upon sustained efforts to expand and modernize its forces, 
ostensibly to pursue by force of arms a policy of "Greater Somalia"1 which the elite had 
made a constitutional imperative. Djibouti, on the other hand, has been less prominent in 
the superpower rivalries in the subregion even though the Americans obtained access to 
air and naval facilities there. However, the French have maintained a strong military 
presence and acted as the main patron since independence in 1977.2 The security of 
Djibouti has been problematic not only because of territorial threats from her immediate 
neighbors but more so the prevalence of highly contentious domestic politics and ethnic 
conflicts.3  
One result of militarization in the Horn was the destructive war between Ethiopia and 
Somalia in 1977-78 over the disputed Ogaden region; but the ultimate outcome was the 
domestic conflagration that engulfed these two countries in subsequent years. Djibouti, 
on its part, has suffered security pressures with the upsurge of insurgency by the Front 
pour le Restauration de l'Unite et la Democratie (FRUD) in 1991 to overthrow the regime 
of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon. Unable or unwilling to address the debilitating 
economic and political contradictions, and reluctant to compromise to achieve political 
solutions, the ruling elites in Ethiopia and Somalia chose to confront rebellious factions 
militarily and plunged their countries into protracted strife. By the end of the eighties 
conditions in these countries had degenerated badly and, in the early 1990s, the embattled 
leaders fled their defunct states. Ethiopia has been reconstituted with the independence of 
Eritrea and the domestic strife appears muted; Somalia, however, remains bankrupt 
politically and Djibouti seems to be tottering on the brink of a civil war.  
What domestic and external factors precipitated the destruction of the Ethiopian and 
Somali states and the unfolding catastrophe in Djibouti? What is the role of militarization 
in the labefaction of these states? Obviously, problems in the Horn are complex and 
cannot be explained unidimensionally; at play at any particular time are multiple forces. 
One important factor is the historic formation of states that included the subjugation of 
other groups in the region. This is the case with Ethiopia which originated coercively as 
an empire; unwilling subjects were forcibly incorporated, most often with the connivance 
of Europeans in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century, a period which coincided with the 
"scramble for Africa."4 As explained by Edmond Keller, the "current boundaries of the 
Ethiopian state were given standing in international law through treaties with the 
European powers operating in the Horn region."5 The main predicament in Ethiopia 
therefore has been the rise of nationalism subsequently among the subjugated groups and 
the determination by the ruling elites to suppress it. The empire's Achilles heel was 
Eritrea and Tigre whose incorporation in the 1950s was aided and abetted by the United 
States.6  
Unlike Ethiopia, which was able to withstand the European colonial assault, Somalia was 
divided into colonial territories claimed by the British, French, Italians, and Ethiopians. 
The problem in post-colonial Somalia emanates from the dispersement of the people 
among Ethiopia, Djibouti, and northeastern Kenya and the nomadic lifestyle that makes 
them migrate across borders. The notion of Greater Somalia therefore expressed the new 
nationalism to re-unify the people. However, as Christopher Clapham observes, the 
difficulty had been "more a dispute about definitions of nationhood: a Somali definition 
based on ethnic common feeling to which land is irrelevant . . ., and an Ethio-Kenyan 
definition based on territory, to which ethnicity is a mere divisive tribalism which stands 
in the way of nation-building."7  
In the Cold War era the Horn attracted much attention in global politics when the 
superpowers scrambled for strategic advantage and elevated military assistance as the 
prime instrument for achieving these ends. One immediate impact of the bipolar 
competition on inter-state relations "was to increase divisiveness among the countries"8 
as ruling elites cashed in for their self-aggrandizement. This condition facilitated the 
selling of themselves to "global competitors for armament . . . [and] support to carry on 
their conflict," as I. William Zartman explains.9 This point is crucial because the 
globalization of conflicts in the Horn led directly to militarization and its attendant 
consequences. Arguably, governance and ethnic relations, as bad as they have been in the 
region, were seriously jaundiced by the alacrity with which the global contestants were 
prepared to be dragged into the conflicts. Conceivably, historic opponents in the area 
would have pursued their objectives by other means, but the scope and intensity of 
conflict would have been restrained without the external intrusions.  
The central thesis in this article is that the disintegration of the Ethiopian and Somali 
states in the early 1990s was caused largely by militarization which was aided and 
abetted essentially by the cold warriors. While Djibouti is yet to suffer the fate of its 
neighbors, the unfolding ethnic conflict, intensifying tension and declining legitimacy of 
the Gouled regime indicate that the metaphor as a 'boiling cauldron'10 could become a 
reality, barring a reversal of current postures and policies. While militarization cannot be 
the sole explanatory variable of the crisis, I argue that the dramatic development of the 
military forces inspired the persistence and prolongation of both the domestic and inter-
state conflicts. A focus on the military aspects, subsequently, would highlight what, in 
my opinion, is the most dynamic factor in conflicts. Because militarization was externally 
inspired, it will also demonstrate the linkage between domestic and international politics 
during the Cold War and the ability of local ruling elites to manipulate the linkage for 
self-aggrandizement, two variables that have been pivotal in the conflicts.  
The objective, therefore, is to trace the origins and dynamics of militarization in the Horn 
in order to establish its consequences. This will be done against the backdrop of mutating 
world politics which have prejudiced decisively the politics of African states since the 
late 1980s. A major question to be explored is whether the demise of the Cold War 
provides opportunities for the former client states to demilitarize and reconstruct their 
political space. If so, what conditions, both internal and external, should prevail to ensure 
the success of reconstruction? The discussion of the prospects for demilitarization and 
reconstruction will necessarily be normative and policy-oriented.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
Militarization is the process and condition within a state where heightened security 
consciousness leads to "a steady growth in the military potential . . . usually accompanied 
by an increasing role for military institutions both in national affairs, including the 
economic, social and political spheres, and in international affairs."11 This process, 
according to Nicole Ball, creates conditions where the "security forces play an active role 
in politics; a large share of government resources is devoted to the security sector; [and] 
the government seeks military, rather than political, solutions to domestic and inter-state 
disputes."12 Such conditions become possible because the ruling class determines to 
strengthen and deploy the forces for state security, which often translates into the 
preservation of elite control and dominance. Empirical evidence will show that Ethiopia 
and Somalia have manifested the general characterization of militarization. Potentially, 
Djibouti could as well become militarized, albeit under different circumstances and with 
different possible outcomes in the post-Cold War period.  
Ethiopia  
Militarization in contemporary Ethiopia began with the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement (MDAA) between Haile Selassie and the United States government in 1953. 
Under the MDAA, the latter assumed near total liability for the modernization of the 
former's armed forces and, in return, was granted unlimited access to the Kagnew 
transmitter station for military and diplomatic communication purposes.13 The agreement 
was the culmination of three years of prodding for assistance by Selassie after his initial 
rebuff in 1950 by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) of the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), which was responsible for determining foreign military assistance.14 The 
committee considered Ethiopia to be inconsequential to American interests; the dissent of 
the Air Force chief of staff, however, was perspicacious. He had argued that American 
presence in Ethiopia "would strengthen the US position in future negotiations and in the 
retention and safeguarding of installations held or desired."15 Prophetically, this argument 
became the raison d'etre for Ethio-American relations in coming decades.  
Haile Selassie persisted and the Department of State encouraged the JCS to reconsider 
the request for assistance. In response, the secretary of the Army designated Lt. Gen. 
Charles L. Bolte to visit Ethiopia as a presidential representative to explain why the US 
government could not furnish arms or a military mission. Reporting to the JSPC on 6 July 
1951, Bolte reiterated the purposelessness of a US mission but recommended the 
approval of the modest request for weapons and communication equipment used by the 
Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in Korea to be used in training replacements.16 
Negotiations continued between Washington and Addis Ababa, and in early 1952 the JCS 
finally ruled that Ethiopia was qualified for reimbursable military aid. Eligibility notes 
were exchanged that year in June and, later that month, the imperial officials presented 
their first formal petition for arms under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Security Act 
involving an estimated expenditure of some $5 million.17  
Despite initial difficulties over agreement interpretation and implementation, the United 
States proceeded to become the patron of Ethiopian forces' development. However, a host 
of other countries assisted this development, particularly in navy, air force, and police 
training. Norway, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, for instance, provided material and 
training for the navy. Israel collaborated with the US to provide counterinsurgency 
assistance; Indian officers staffed the military academies; Sweden assisted the air force; 
and West Germany provided equipment for para-military forces for internal security. In 
spite of these other sources of assistance, the United States remained the main prop of the 
imperial regime and provided the bulk of the military hardware and training.  
American patronage continued until the overthrow of Selassie in 1974 by a radical group 
of military officers who initiated a scientific socialist revolution. The new Armed Forces 
Coordinating Committee, which formed in April that year, itself underwent several 
bloody changes until the emergence of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam as leader in 
February 1977. Despite the radicalism of the military regime, which included the 
nationalization of American properties without compensation in 1975 and the refusal to 
sign the fiscal year 1977 Foreign Military Sales credit agreement, the United States 
continued the assistance program at accelerated levels in 1976. For instance, over $100 
million cash sales were effected, some $22 million worth of replacement parts and 
ammunition were projected, and $6.6 million in grant military assistance, $5.3 million in 
grant economic aid, $6.6 million in Public Law 480 food sales and grants were given in 
1976.18 These were granted after Mengistu had indicated the determination to shift 
security and ideological alliance away from the United States. Not until the regime had 
unilaterally abrogated the MDAA in May 1977 did the US Congress terminate all forms 
of aid, with the alibi of opposition to human rights abuses in Ethiopia.  
The termination of relations was followed almost instantaneously by a new accord 
between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. This dramatic reversal of alliances in the Horn 
was influenced by the Soviet perception of Ethiopia as an important beachhead for 
strategic advantage over the United States; it also demonstrated a strong ideological stake 
because Mengistu showed greater promise for socialist development. As noted by David 
and Marina Ottaway, the Soviets "saw in Ethiopia with its class conflicts a much greater 
revolutionary potential than in any other African country, even shades of their own 
revolution."19 Consequently, the Soviets moved aggressively to establish themselves by 
massively arming Ethiopia because of escalating tension with Somalia. According to one 
source, by 1980 in the short span of three years, the Soviets equipped Ethiopia with over 
$2 billion worth of arms and other military supplies. In addition, over 1,300 Soviet 
military advisers, supplemented by 250 East Germans and 17,000 Cuban troops were sent 
to support the war effort against Somalia.20 According to the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, between 1985 and 1989 a total of $3.805 billion worth of arms 
were transferred to Ethiopia with the bulk (about 85 percent) coming from the Soviet 
Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact; China and other East Asian countries, and a few 
European countries also sent arms.21 Thus, just as the militarization of Ethiopia under 
Haile Selassie was sustained essentially by the United States, under Mengistu it was 
assisted primarily by the Soviet Union.  
The Soviets backed Mengistu until the politics of glasnost and perestroika, introduced by 
President Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, injected radical changes in Soviet 
domestic and foreign orientation to undermine the Cold War. Although the Soviets scaled 
down their support dramatically and encouraged Mengistu to seek political solutions to 
his war against the rebellious Eritreans, Tigreans and other minorities, they maintained 
their presence in Ethiopia to the very end of his rule. As reported by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 550 Soviet advisers and technicians together with 25 
Cubans, 200 North Koreans and 125 Israelis struggled in vain to save his regime in 
1990.22  
Somalia 
Militarization in Somalia was motivated primarily by the desire to fulfill the ambition of 
creating a Greater Somalia by coercive means. Following independence in 1960, the elite 
had regarded all "territories inhabited by Somalis" to be historically part of the nation and 
therefore was determined to reincorporate them.23 While these areas were of no particular 
economic importance to all contestants, they occupied a special place in the Somali sense 
of nationhood, which is uniquely strong in Africa.24 Thus the nation emerged with a 
strong notion of irredentism that inspired militarism. Elite instability between 1960 and 
1969, however, impeded a strategy to obtain sustained external support for the irredentist 
ambition until General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in a military coup on 21 
October 1969.25 As later events were to show, the military build-up became a means for 
Barre to maintain his hold on power and, ultimately, to plunge the country into a political 
abyss. Through the years he engaged his country in a low level war in the so-called 
"Somali territories" as part of the irredentist policy; in 1977-78, however, he threw his 
military weight behind the ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden in their war against Ethiopia.  
At the time Americans were flooding Ethiopia with arms, the Soviets were anxious to 
counter their influence in the Horn. Siad Barre provided the opportunity when he 
proclaimed a "scientific socialist" policy in 1972 and courted the Soviets who 
immediately began to supply arms. The friendship was sealed in July 1974 when Soviet 
President Nikolai Podgorny visited Mogadishu and signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Barre. The Soviets improved the port of Berbera to serve as handling, 
refuelling and storage facilities for their surface-to-surface missiles and provisioned 
Somalia with advanced weaponry and military training.  
Strengthened by the arms, Somalia intensified its support for dissidents in the Ogaden. 
The failure of the Soviets to convince Siad Barre to form a partnership with the new 
socialist state of Ethiopia resulted in the war that began in mid-1977. Perhaps misreading 
American statements, Barre interpreted Washington's assurances not to oppose "further 
guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden" and to "consider sympathetically Somali's legitimate 
defense needs"26 to be approval for a military campaign. Feeling encouraged, he launched 
the Ogaden attack but hopes for Western assistance proved deceptive. As described by 
Zartman, after some initial losses, Ethiopia managed to court the Soviets and their allies, 
particularly the Cubans who sent thousands of military advisers and $1 billion worth of 
arms to eventually turn the tide against Somalia.27  
In a surprise move in November 1977, Somalia terminated the 1974 treaty with the 
Soviets and expelled their advisers and broke relations with Cuba. These actions were in 
response to the Soviet decision to embrace the Mengistu regime. Welcoming the new 
twist in Soviet-Somali relations, the United States moved steadily to become the new 
patron of Somalia. With their loss of Ethiopia, the Americans were anxious to gain a new 
foothold in the Horn, particularly following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979; they needed access for a new Rapid Deployment Force which had been 
formed to counteract the perceived Soviet threat in the Gulf region. The March 1980 
Facility Access Agreement gave the US access to air and naval bases in Berbera, 
Mogadishu and Kismayo. In return, Somalia was furnished with military aid during the 
1980s but not on levels often sought by the Barre government. He, however, succeeded in 
getting additional supplies from countries such as Libya, Italy, Germany, France, South 
Africa, China and other countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Between 1985 
and 1989 about $160 million worth of arms were delivered to Somalia from these various 
sources.28  
Djibouti  
In ethnic terms the political landscape of Djibouti resembles that of Ethiopia even though 
their historic formations are quite different. Whereas the latter was founded as an empire, 
the former emerged as a result of European colonialism; nonetheless, they share common 
problems of ethnic nationalism. With a population of less than one million, Djibouti is 
comprised of two dominant groups, the Afar and Issa, which together constitute about 53 
percent of the population and five other groups, namely, the Gadabouris (15 percent), 
Issaks (13.3 percent), Arabs  mostly Yemenis  (6 percent), French and other European 
nationals (4 percent), and a final group of economic migrants.29 Djiboutian politics have 
been strained by the fact that the two dominant groups share affinity with the two warring 
neighbors: the Issas' with Somalia and the Afars with Ethiopia. Further complicating the 
political scene was the claim by both Ethiopia and Somalia over Djibouti territory, which 
had remained an object of Western, especially French, interest because of its geostrategic 
location. In fact, the French have remained the dominant foreign force in the country with 
a relatively powerful military presence. Thus security in the country has been tenuous 
since independence.  
Before 1958, as Clapham explains, the Issas, who comprised about a third of the 
population, dominated politics in the territory, but because their leader opposed the 
French in a 1958 referendum to determine the association with France, they lost favor 
with the colonists who shifted their support to the Afar-Danakil. The French gradually 
built up the political opposition of the Afars after winning another Guinea-style 
referendum in 1966 in which France aided the result by expelling many potential voters 
who were considered immigrant Somali.30 Ethiopia cooperated with France in 
maintaining the Afars to deprive Somalia from gaining access through the Issas.  
In a major policy shift, France supported the election of an Issa Somali, Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon to become the president and an Afar, Ahmed Dini to become the prime minister 
of the new republic in 1977. Through the years Gouled strengthened his powers and, at 
the same time, attempted to "craft a ruling coalition inclusive of all groups but which 
nonetheless ensured control by the Issa ethnic group."31 His efforts to achieve an 
ethnically-balanced political system has been undermined by the disruptive impact of 
inter-ethnic relations in the region. As Schraeder points out, the Afars have been 
sympathetic to their brethren in Ethiopia while the Issas have equally sympathized with 
the Somali irredentist policy; hence, during the Ogaden war Djiboutians fought against 
each other.32  
Most decisive in the unfolding crisis in Djibouti is the loss of legitimacy of the Gouled 
government in the eyes of the Afars. They have been frustrated by the dominance of the 
Issas of the civil service, the armed forces and the ruling party33 and have transformed 
their dissatisfaction into opposition movements, the most powerful being the FRUD, 
which began guerrilla warfare with about 3,000 fighters in late 1991. Since then the 
ruling Popular Rally for Progress (PRP) has fractured and several other opposition groups 
have emerged, including the Movement for Unity and Democracy (UD), United 
Opposition Front (UOF), and Democratic Renewal Party (DRP).  
Presently political conditions in Djibouti resemble those in pre-1991 Ethiopia and 
Somalia. In typical Horn-style politics, the Gouled government has responded to growing 
opposition by beefing up the armed forces. In 1992, armed forces personnel were 
increased by 200 to 3,200 and military expenditures for this tiny state jumped from $31 
million in 1991 to $38 million in 1992.34 As modest as these increases may appear, the 
1992 military budget represented 9.6 percent of the gross national product and therefore 
could have significant negative impact on socio-economic development.  
Attempts to resolve the domestic crisis through the ballot box proved illusive when 
opposition groups alleged fraud in the May 1993 elections that gave Gouled his fourth 
term of office. Hence, the warfare has continued with increasing intensity since July of 
that year when the government launched a major offensive against FRUD and disrupted 
the scheduled visit by the French Minister of Cooperation Michel Rousin.35 Although the 
country has not attained the levels of militarization achieved in neighboring Ethiopia and 
Somalia, the future looks uncertain and bleak. French policy at this time and the politics 
Gouled elects to pursue to resolve the conflict would determine possible outcomes. Will 
the French intervene on behalf of Gouled by sending more arms and deploying their 
troops for his defense? Or, would they encourage him to compromise with his opponents? 
Would Gouled prefer to resolve the conflict on the battlefield just as Mengistu and Barre 
did or would he seek democratic solutions? These are critical questions which could 
shape the direction of Djibouti politics in the coming years.  
DIMENSIONS OF MILITARIZATION  
Four main features of militarization in the Horn will be briefly discussed relative to 
Ethiopia and Somalia where they were most evident and in Djibouti where the current 
situation portends an ominous political future. The features are: quantitative growth of 
the armed forces; escalated defense expenditure; high propensity for internal and external 
war; and military dominance of civil society.  
Growth in Force Levels and Expenditure  
In Ethiopia the army grew from the approximately 18,000 enlisted men in 1956 to 29,000 
by 1964. By his final year in 1974, Haile Selassie had expanded the army to 41,000. 
Partly because of the war with Somalia and partly to consolidate itself in power and 
defeat the Eritrean and Tigray rebellion, Mengistu's regime accelerated the growth from 
50,000 in 1975 to a record 300,000 in 1986-87, only to drop slightly to 250,000 in 
1989.36 In his final stand against the rebellion in 1990-91, Mengistu put 438,000 men and 
women into active military service. Following Eritrea's independence in April 1993, the 
forces dropped to 100,000; most were former members of the Tigray People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF) with about 15,000 from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which was 
showing growing signs of opposition to the new provisional government in Addis 
Ababa.37  
As can be expected, upsizing the forces required higher defense spending. From $39 
million in 1969, spending rose through the years to hit $187 million in 1977; it 
accelerated rapidly from $351 million in 1979 to $763 million in 1989. In the local 
Ethiopian currency (birr), expenditures rose from 744 million in 1980 to a high 1.6 billion 
in 1989, according to the Stockholm-based SIPRI.38 Significantly, until 1991 government 
finance was dominated by military requirements; in 1988 it was officially admitted that 
defense spending accounted for 50 percent of Ethiopia's regular budget. The disbanding 
of Mengistu's forces in May 1991 following the victory of Eritrea was expected to result 
in a dramatic drop in budgetary commitments, but because of continuing challenges to 
the provisional regime, military spending rose astronomically from $370 million in 1991 
to $811 million in 1992, a vast increase from 8.9 to 20.1 percentage of the gross national 
product.39  
Force growth in Somalia followed a similar track, albeit on a lesser scale, obviously 
because of the country's limited material resources. From a mere manpower level of 
2,000 in 1960, the forces grew to 14,000 in 1968 and rose progressively through the years 
to 30,000 by 1974, ostensibly to support the policy of irredentism. During the 1977-78 
war with Ethiopia, Somali forces grew to 54,000 and this number was maintained more 
or less up to the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. Since then the forces have disintegrated 
and multiple leaders have formed private armies to engage each other in a fratricidal war.  
Somali military expenditure grew concurrently with the armed forces. From an annual 
low of $11 million in 1969, it rose to $160 million in 1982 and then declined through the 
rest of the decade. These figures excluded the value of Soviet supplies which in the 1970s 
gave Somalia a rough parity in military strength with Ethiopia, as one analyst 
suggested.40 This may explain Somalia's endurance in the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia, 
which compelled the latter to seek massive assistance from the Soviets.  
Ironically, despite the extraordinary national extravagance on the military, the armed 
forces in both Ethiopia and Somalia were not just defeated on the battlefield by internal 
adversaries, but they went down together with the state. In both countries "no 
recognizable organization" existed for the armed forces following their defeat.41 This 
outcome certainly suggests poor preparation and strategy for low-intensity operations, 
similar to the American experience in Vietnam. For instance, Siad Barre's assembling of 
tank battalions, surface-to-air brigades, 40 air defense artillery battalions, 71 surface-to-
air missiles of various types, patrol and torpedo boats and even an amphibious craft42 
were all misplaced for urban guerrilla warfare. More important, perhaps, is the lesson that 
militarization is no indefinite guarantor of state security and elite dominance.  
Evidence from the Djiboutian scene shows a steady militarization process for a country 
of its size. The national army numbered about 2,600 throughout the 1980s and included 
an 800-strong frontier commando unit, 200-strong armored company, 300-strong 
gendarmerie force, and 900-strong infantry commando regiment. Additionally, the 
country maintained an internal security force of 1,400 which included 1,200 in the 
National Security Force. The French military presence which stood at 3,500-strong in the 
1980s had grown to 3,650 by 1991. With these forces President Gouled may feel secure, 
but the experience of Mengistu and Barre would indicate that any such feeling would be 
fool-hardy.  
Civil-Military Relations and the Demise of States  
The effects of over two decades of militarization in the Horn were drastic: the armed 
forces dominated and controlled the Ethiopian (1974-91) and Somali (1969-93) societies; 
national economies were ruined; domestic conflicts and differences over border 
demarcations were militarized; and war became an acceptable means for settling political 
differences. The problem of security was compounded by the decline in economic 
resources which, in turn, was complicated in Somalia by the irredentist policy and 
growing domestic unrest; in Ethiopia it was compounded by the aggressive pursuit of 
independence by the Eritreans and Tigreans and the equally aggressive resistance by 
Ethiopian authorities.  
In both cases, the ruling elites simply refused to compromise their hold on power and 
determined to achieve military victory over their opponents. These realities defined 
sharply the role of the armed forces in the two countries and American and Soviet 
support in maintaining them. The forces and national security became the focus of 
assistance and development and they gained pre-eminent positions in their respective 
societies. As governing bodies, the military controlled legislative, judiciary and executive 
powers. The excessive militarization, among other factors, paradoxically enfeebled the 
states and led to their ultimate demise.  
Demise of the Ethiopian State  
In Ethiopia the politically dominant Amhara elite focused attention and energy on self-
preservation; the material development and well-being of society in general were 
neglected and this had serious consequences. In the 1970s, for example, Ethiopia had an 
illiteracy rate of about 90 percent of a population of 30 million; life expectancy at birth 
stood at 36 years. Safe drinking water was almost non-existent and infant mortality rate 
was about 150 deaths under one year per one thousand. As one general who headed the 
American military group observed, the "cumulative impact of the abject poverty and 
misery, the illiteracy, the immense maldistribution of wealth . . ., the rampant collusive 
corruption, the completely ruthless autocratic 'divide and rule' exercise of power by the 
Emperor"43 permeated the fabric of the Ethiopian society. These debilitating socio-
economic conditions affirmed the claims of oppression by opponents of Haile Selassie 
and contributed to his overthrow by the military in 1974.  
As with the emperor, Mengistu's priority was not socio-economic development, it was to 
fight an unwinnable war against rebels. His 15 years of scientific socialist 
experimentation further impoverished his people: statistically the World Bank in the 
1980s rated the country as the most deprived nation on earth. With a population of about 
45 million, Ethiopia had a GNP per capita of $130 in 1987; the GDP growth of 
production declined from the 2.7 percent registered between 1965 to 1980 to 0.9 percent 
between 1980 and 1987. In the same period, agricultural production declined from 1.2 
percent to -2.1 percent.44 In a 1990 study of 140 countries by the Washington-based 
World Priorities, Ethiopia ranked 137th, 121st and 125th on GNP per capita, education 
and health respectively; on military expenditure per capita, however, it ranked 86th. With 
a population of 51 million the country had only 92,000 teachers and a mere 800 
physicians.45  
Mengistu's dogged determination to win on the battlefield naturally bloated the armed 
forces; it also demoralized his forces when their efforts proved fruitless. Moreover, 
pressure from the separatist groups grew unbearably intense with the impetus clearly on 
their side. By February 1990, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) had almost 
overrun the strategically vital port of Massawa; other groups closed in on Addis Ababa. 
Unfortunately for him, this time the Soviets were averse to rescuing him as they did in 
1977-78. His own country in turmoil over severe economic contraction and threats of 
territorial disintegration, and fanning glasnost and perestroika to foster Western support, 
former Soviet President Gorbachev was in no mood to prop up a regime which, in any 
case, teetered on the brink of demise. Since 1987, the Soviets had attempted to distance 
themselves from Mengistu's failing fortunes. In April 1990, Gorbachev pulled most of his 
military advisers and even refused to allow Soviet cargo planes in Addis Ababa to be 
used to resupply Asmara, which had been cut-off by the separatists.  
Further diminishing Mengistu's options was the strong wind of political change that blew 
across the continent during 1989-90, primarily as a result of the demise of the Cold War. 
The "severe economic and political disappointments of the 1980s" also precluded politics 
as usual.46 As one African leader after another announced reforms, the psychological 
pressure, at least, would have compelled him to fall in line, especially since Ethiopian 
conditions epitomized the political and economic malaise that had gripped the continent. 
He was forced to concede to the basic demand of Eritrean autonomy at the US-sponsored 
peace negotiations in February 1991.  
However, Mengistu's compromises came too late. Forces of the EPLF, the TPLF and the 
Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), a new coalition of various 
ethnic groups, were indisputably in control of the battlefields. The government's forces, 
on the other hand, were completely exhausted and they disintegrated rapidly under fire. 
The second round of American-brokered peace talks was underway in London in May 
1991 when, on the 21st, Mengistu resigned the presidency unceremoniously and boarded 
his private plane for a self-imposed exile in Zimbabwe. His regime and the socialist state 
collapsed immediately as the EPDRF troops entered and occupied Addis Ababa. Thus 
ended the tumultuous rule of Mengistu.  
The installation in power of the provisional government of Meles Zenawi in June 1991, 
and the agreement among all political factions to recognize the right of each ethnic group 
to self-determination may have blunted the internecine domestic conflict. The emergence 
of Eritrea into independence in particular may have closed the chapter on the longest 
secessionist war in Africa. However, all is not so well in Ethiopia. Opposition is growing 
against the ruling EPDRF coalition. Even though the coalition signed a cease-fire 
agreement with the Oromo Liberation Front in April 1992, the OLF and other groups, the 
All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) and the National Democratic Union (NDU) 
boycotted the regional council elections two months later and the elections could not be 
held in the Afar and Somali regions because of a precarious security situation.47  
Demise of the Somali State 
The fate of Siad Barre's state followed an analogous track. Conditions in Somalia were 
equally oppressive, but he resisted popular demand for change. Instead, he focused 
national energy on the development of the armed forces for domestic and foreign defense 
and offense. The internal crisis reached its apogee in May 1989, when opposition forces 
launched a guerrilla war to overthrow him. As the unrest deepened together with an 
economy in disarray and the changing winds of African politics, Barre relented and 
announced a program of political and economic reforms in January 1989, particularly for 
the turbulent northern provinces. These were never implemented, however, and the war 
proceeded with increasing intensity.  
As government forces could not stem the tide of popular uprising, Siad Barre fled 
Mogadishu in an armored personnel carrier in December 1991. But unlike Ethiopia, the 
struggle for power and control following the fall of the regime took a tragic turn. The 
various warring factions, particularly Mohammed Ferrah Aideed's Somali National 
Alliance (SNA) and chief rival Gen. Mohammed Siyad Morgan, could not agree on who 
would fill the leadership vacuum and the country broke up on clannish lines and 
traditional leaders engaged each other in blood-letting for control. The northeastern 
region of the country declared itself an independent republic of Somaliland.  
With conditions deteriorating so badly, the international community, led by the United 
Nations and, later the United States, had to send troops on a humanitarian mission. In 
August 1992, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) arrived in Mogadishu but was 
unable to make much headway. In December the US-led multinational Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) landed. On 4 May 1993, UNITAF handed over control of the military 
and humanitarian operations to UNOSOM II. Nonetheless, by the end of the year the 
state of Somalia had decomposed to crown a long period of political, economic and 
military bankruptcy. In March 1994, the US withdrew the remainder of its forces, and in 
March 1995 the UN ended its mission.  
The tragedy of Somalia epitomized the ultimate outcome of militarization. The long rule 
of Siad Barre nurtured a national culture that legitimized violence in the settlement of 
disputes; in his vain attempt to maintain his government, he saturated the country with 
arms. His opponents did likewise in order to match his military power. Thus, following 
his downfall, the fractured society was awash in arms as each faction sought to gain 
dominance by military means. Commenting that "[t]here [were] more arms than food in 
Somalia" in view of a devastating famine, the UN Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali 
aptly observed that the arms were not fabricated in Somalia: "they were given by the 
outside world, to serve outside interests" and that "those who provide arms are partners in 
the crime."48 These observations underscored the direct linkage between external and 
domestic forces in the creation of the quagmire.  
Needless to say, the arms proliferation undermined the mediating role of traditional 
elders, facilitated the descent into full civil war that followed, and severely hampered the 
efforts of volunteer agencies and multinational military forces to distribute food, restore 
law and order and create a functioning government. The task of disarming Somalia 
proved deadly. While the UN showed a determination and commitment to restore the 
country to civility, the armed groups proved resilient with the capacity to resist and make 
deadlier the task of the world body. Twenty-four Pakistani troops of the UNOSOM were 
ambushed in June 1993; a UN helicopter was also shot down on 24 September, killing 
four soldiers. These incidents escalated the conflict between the UN and Somali 
opposition forces, reportedly led by Mohammed Aideed, and attempts by the Americans 
to kill or capture him militarized the humanitarian mission and caused a serious backlash 
for President Bill Clinton who, consequently, adopted a new approach in October 1993 to 
accommodate Aideed in the search for a political settlement and national building in 
Somalia.  
The restoration of Somalia has proved to be a difficult enterprise not simply because of 
the traditional antagonisms among the various clans; neither is it because of any natural 
character of the people. The failure of the external efforts stems from the historic 
involvement of foreign powers in Somali affairs; the people have been highly suspicious 
and even resentful of the good intentions of the United States and the UN, especially 
because of their paternalistic and patronizing approach to the crisis. For instance, combat-
ready American marines made their spectacular amphibious landings without any 
coordination with the local militia and the program of food distribution proceeded 
without the involvement of these militia who controlled the territories to be traversed. 
Because the humanitarian exercise was so militarized, it quickly aroused suspicions about 
the real intent of the Americans.  
Thus, the laudable effort soon turned into a quagmire and the massive international 
undertaking to save Somalia had to be aborted and the country's future continues to hang 
in the balance. Meanwhile, a total of 355,000 war and war-related deaths were reported 
between 1988-1992; with a population of 7.8 million in 1990, Somalia had 64,000 under 
arms but only 11,000 teachers and 500 physicians in 1992.49 This picture is only but a 
small reflection of the abject impoverishment that years of militarization have brought 
upon the people of Somalia.  
TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION  
What are the prospects for peace and progress in the turbulent Horn of Africa? 
Undoubtedly, the demise of the Cold War offers opportunities for Ethiopia and Somalia 
to rebuild and for Djibouti to strengthen its fragile polity, even though new constraints on 
security and development could complicate and frustrate such possibilities. For instance, 
it may prove difficult to satisfy the parochial desires of the various groups, ethnic and 
clan cleavages, and some may actively resist the challenges of the new era. This difficulty 
in reconciling traditional enemies may even deter mediators, sympathizers and supporters 
of peace and reconstruction. Also, the emerging democratic rule in eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union would constrict Western support for reconstruction in the Horn 
as competition for aid will be more intense. Indeed, with its diminished global strategic 
relevance, the Horn could be marginalized in a world without competing ideologies. 
Needless to say, the present is not an auspicious time for developing nations that were 
caught in the vortex of the East-West conflict to rechart and recast the course of their 
history.  
The task of reconstruction could be difficult, if not impossible, in a militarized 
environment because it inhibits individual and collective creative energies toward 
development. New approaches to nation building must, therefore, be sought within the 
framework of demilitarization which should exceed mere demobilization and downsizing 
of armed forces. To avoid the pitfalls and social contradictions that crippled the previous 
states, demilitarization should steer toward authentic political and economic change in the 
region at large.  
To demobilize the armed forces is to render thousands unemployed. People who have 
known nothing but war for years will suddenly be let loose. To contain the potential for 
unrest and to meet the important need for rapid reconstruction and to give millions self-
worth and pride, Ethiopia and Somalia should consider the formation of workers brigades 
following demobilization. The brigades should have the specific purpose of assisting in 
national reconstruction for a specified period after which they should also be demobilized 
because they should have been trained in the process for future self-employment. Their 
task should include food production, construction of roads, schools, and other public 
amenities. Funding for such an undertaking should be mobilized under the auspices of the 
United Nations. Analogous to conditions in Japan and Germany at the end of World War 
II, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea should be earmarked for a special development 
assistance. Another Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM would be more costly than 
funding such civilian initiatives.  
The approach to peace and progress should recognize the commonalities among the 
various nationalities on the Horn. They have a long shared history, have long intermixed 
and their geographic contiguity and infrastructure inter-linkages recommend a strong 
base for collective action toward peace and development. It is important for Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea to find a common ground for peaceful co-existence which 
alone would ensure their security and progress. The history and objective conditions of 
the region suggest four collective approaches toward this end: non-aggression pact, 
policy of disarmament and non-militarization, cultivation of democratic culture, and 
regional economic cooperation and integration.  
•  Treaty of Non-aggression  
To create a lasting peace in the Horn, it is imperative that a non-aggression pact be signed 
among Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Somalia must renounce the notion of 
Greater Somalia; Ethiopia's acceptance of Eritrea's independence should be sustained; 
and all must honor Djibouti's sovereignty and neutrality. The affirmation of existing 
borders will eliminate the root cause of conflicts; moreover, by assuring equal 
sovereignty it will create confidence in the states for discussions toward regional 
cooperation.  
•  Policy of Disarmament and Non-militarization  
A policy of disarmament should be pursued by all four Horn states. Implicitly, armies 
would be downsized radically where they exist; a few hundred may be maintained to 
protect local strategic points. Ethiopia and Somalia should take advantage of the collapse 
of organized national armies and build a true civil polity; Eritrea should do likewise as a 
new state and disavow any pretence to armament. Such a policy among the three will 
pressure Djibouti to rid itself of French influence, so that the subregion will be free of 
any foreign military presence. The policy of disarmament and non-militarization will not 
only support the non-aggression pact, but would allow national energies and resources to 
be channelled into economically productive programs. Notably, similar orientation in 
Japan and Germany following World War II has been fundamental to their subsequent 
economic and political successes.  
•  Nurturing Democratic Culture  
Political structures and institutions should be created to nurture democratic governance 
taking full cognizance of the realities of the socio-ethnic configurations in the states. 
While preserving the basic tenets of constitutional democracy, adequate provisions 
should be made to address the peculiarities of Horn societies. For instance, it may be 
preferable to institute some form of ethnic autonomies rather than the centralized 
governments which, in the past, enabled one group to dominate the state. Structure of 
national governments and appointments should also be made to reflect the ethnic 
composition of the society. The political dispensation should assure full participation of 
citizens in the political process; orderly and peaceful leadership change (incumbent 
leaders must trailblaze by sponsoring transparent elections and leaving office gracefully 
in event of a loss); and the protection of human rights. Finally, vigorous mass education 
(both formal and informal) should be undertaken to nurture democratic culture.  
•  Economic Cooperation and Integration 
Economic development is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in microstates with 
limited natural endowments. Such is the case of most African states and their ultimate 
economic salvation lies in integrated economies. The Horn states are no exception and it 
will be futile for them to pursue isolated development. Agreeing on an open market 
system with the necessary regulations, the Horn states should create structures that would 
support the development of an integrated regional economy and allow free movement of 
people across borders. The January 1993 trade agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is 
a good start and should be extended to the other states to form the basis for an integrated 
regional trade system. Realistically, state intervention in the economy may be necessary 
at the early stages of reconstruction; Japan and Germany did the same. However, such 
interventions should not be pursued at the expense of individual freedom and liberties to 
produce and own wealth so as not to blunt private initiatives that would ultimately sustain 
economic development.  
The emphasis on de-militarization, collective political and economic security and 
democratization is an important one and cannot be repudiated summarily as naive or 
incomprehensible because of the persistence of ethnic strife and the lack of a history of 
democratic practice in the region. The political bankruptcy of regimes and past failures to 
reconcile warring factions only suggest the difficulty and frustration not the absurdity of 
seeking lasting solutions. The turbulence on the Horn is, in fact, the product of a system 
constructed in time and space; to dismiss any possibility for reconstruction and to 
describe the area as "a mean, brutal part of the earth whose peoples are committed to the 
idea that violence can resolve political difficulties"50 is not only uncharitable but cruel. 
Until recently the same extremism could be expressed about the Palestinians and South 
Africans who were considered the most recalcitrant and violent in politics. It was 
incomprehensible that Nelson Mandela would be freed to be elected president of a 
democratic South Africa. Whoever thought in August 1993 that on 13 September 1995 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin would shake hands with PLO leader Yasser Arafat 
on the lawns of the White House over a peace agreement and for Arafat to be mobbed the 
next day by Senators at the US Capitol? These recent events give hope and attest to the 
fact that those who make history master and respond positively to the exigencies of the 
present and do not hold tenaciously to the past.  
A legitimate concern, however, is whether there are capable leaders at this critical 
historical juncture who understand the past and are prepared to be guided progressively 
by it to change course. Signs are that in Eritrea the government of Isaias Afewerki is 
steadily building democratic structures; in Ethiopia the provisional regime of Meles 
Zenawi has reportedly abandoned the forced unity of the country and given autonomy to 
nationalities. As A.M. Babu observes, the "right to self-determination" in the new 
Ethiopia is "a pioneering trend that will salvage Africa from its present ethnic and 
cultural crisis."51 This notable shift in a long-standing policy has not fully resolved the 
nationalities question because ethnic agitation lingers in some quarters. However, it 
reflects a new appreciation for the exigencies of the present, an unthinkable development 
in the country under both Haile Selassie and Mengistu. The Somali case remains 
pathological; however, it is not inconceivable that the dynamics of conflict could change 
to allow the emergence of progressive leaders.  
CONCLUSION  
The challenge of reconstruction in the Horn is enormous and even daunting. It calls for 
legitimate leaders who can resist the temptation of power intoxication and mobilize the 
people toward progressive goals; those who can devise appropriate strategies to create 
political and economic infrastructure that leads to stability and prosperity. Attempts 
should be made to break primordial ties and forge enlightened national policies that 
ensure regional peace. And, recognizing the history and objective realities of the Horn, 
national development and security must be sought within a framework of non-
militarization and renunciation of territorial claims, democratic politics, and subregional 
economic cooperation and integration.  
After decades of strife, economic bankruptcy, political chaos, and destructive ideologies 
of militarization, only a long-term strategy for peace, stability and development can 
restore the Horn states to permanent normalcy. The demise of the Cold War does not 
necessarily guarantee the solution of regional conflicts; it could even ignite them as the 
tragedy of Yugoslavia demonstrates. However, the decline of ideological polarization in 
world politics makes it less constraining to seek sustainable and enduring rather than ad 
hoc and indeterminate solutions. What is needed is the persistence of the world's 
goodwill, support and encouragement for change in troubled regions such as the Horn. In 
this context, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea should seek their place under the sun 
on their own terms as dictated by their historic and current realities. Their leaders have 
the awesome responsibility to make this happen.  
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